Editing 2010-11-14 (section)

==Transcript==
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:[Describe panel here]
:Maybe I'm just a naive undergrad, but you know what none of you "genius" economists account for in your equations: ?! The fact that you're fucking over the poor!
:Iecon
:My god. He's right.
:All these years how could we
:No, wait. Here itis. Page 862
:From eq. (11.2) it is clear that dp/di - ry 0 which quires
:A(p-k)
:(b,(p)-b.(p)
:(11.3)
:1-).
:or if p is either 0 or 1 (because when P - 1.78 - y). When eq. (11.3)is satisfied, P is stationary because the effects of conformist transmission (the left hand side of eq. (11.3)) just offset the effects of differential payoffs (the right-hand side). Thus, in the presence of conformist trans-mission, and for p e (0,1), the equilibrium payoffs to the norm favored by conformism will always be less than the payoffs of the more preva lent norm. Figure 11.1 illustrates such an equilibrium. For p (0,1), dp/dr takes the sign of An equilibrium
:is asymptotically stable (self if the derivative of cq. 11.2) with respect to p is negative, requiring that
:db,
:db,
:A (foip)
:(11.4a)
:dp dp
:A
:(11.4b)
:Caption: which is satisfied if the conformist advantage conferred on x by a small increase in p. namely NII A), is more than offset by the payoff ad-conferred on y by the same increase in p (the right-hand side). figure 11.1. p represents the solution to eq. (11.3) satisfying eq. 11.4a) and is hence a stable equilibrium distribution of norms. From eqs. (11.3) and (11.4a) we see that conformism has two effects.